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INTRODUCTION
It’s early in the morning and though there may be a long day of
work ahead, the alarm clock is easy on the ears. The clock radio
on the nightstand has the alarm set to “radio,” and the radio itself
has been set to WFUV 90.7 FM, Fordham University’s own listener-supported public radio station. 1 Instead of the dreaded banshee wail of an alarm clock, a modest pair of speakers pipes radio
programming into my bedroom that starts my day perhaps the way
a cup of coffee does for many others. In a radio market the likes of
New York City’s, the dial of which can often seem as congested as
rush hour on the subway, WFUV is a welcome reprieve. My
analysis is subjective, but it would seem that in a medium driven
by advertising revenue, in an area with as high a population density
as New York City’s, market conditions create a sort of diluted content on the radio, the quality of which, one may suspect, often
plays second fiddle to the goal of increasing advertiser revenue by
way of attracting the highest volume of listenership possible. 2
By way of comparison, WFUV is a not-for-profit, noncommercial entity whose funding comes from the voluntary contributions
of its listeners and corporate “underwrit[ers].” 3 This support enables WFUV largely to escape the need experienced by most
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2886. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
*
J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, May 2009; Bachelor of Arts,
English, Amherst College, 2002. I would like to acknowledge the enjoyment and availability of music generally as the inspiration for this Comment, and the support of my
family and friends for helping me stay true to said inspiration, even in a law journal footnote. I would especially like to thank Professor Andrew Sims for his feedback and encouragement during the development of this Comment, and my dearest Sara for her
warmth, endless perspective and love throughout my time at Fordham Law.
1
See generally WFUV 90.7 FM Public Radio from Fordham University in New York
City, http://www.wfuv.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
2
See Robert J. Delchin, Musical Copyright Law: Past, Present and Future of Online
Music Distribution, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343, 360–63 (2004); Gregory M.
Prindle, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has Diminished Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279, 302–21 (2003).
3
See WFUV Public Radio—Support WFUV, http://www.wfuv.org/support/
index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
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commercial broadcasters to constantly cater to their advertising
constituency. 4 Perhaps it is also what allows WFUV to provide
programming content the likes of which appeals to the interests of
those for whom an appeal to the broadest number of people possible isn’t, for lack of a better word, appealing at all. In my experience, WFUV has consistently programmed content in line with my
existing musical interests, introduced me to a wide range of emerging talent and influenced my music purchasing and concert attendance decisions with respect to both new and familiar artists.
It was a welcome discovery then that I made, far from my bedroom, in an old office cubicle without access to a radio, where I
learned that I could receive WFUV broadcasts on my computer
through the Internet. 5 In an era of technological innovation
marked by the emergence of Apple’s iPod and iTunes technology,
I considered the new medium for the old format altogether fitting,
appropriate and exciting. Whereas the industry for the transmission of actual copies of music was undergoing massive reinvention, it seemed logical that traditional radio should likewise benefit
from and exploit the potential for growth through technology. This
was my introduction to “webcasting,” which refers to both “Internet radio stations and online ‘simulcasts’ of terrestrial radio broadcasts.” 6 Within the broader universe of webcasters, WFUV quali4
See Delchin, supra note 2, at 360–63; Laura M. Holson, With By-the-Numbers Radio, Requests Are a Dying Breed, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F06E1DA1230F932A25754C0A9649C
8B63.
5
See WFUV Public Radio—WFUV On-Air: Listen Live, http://www.wfuv.org/
audio/stream.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
6
Recent Legislation, Copyright Law—Congress Responds to Copyright Arbitration
Royalty Panel’s Webcasting Rates.—Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (to be Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114(F)–(G)), 116 HARV. L. REV.
1920, 1920 n.2 (2003). “Unlike file-swapping services, through which users download
copies of songs from other users, webcasts are ‘streamed’ and leave no useable copy on
the listener's computer.” Id. SoundExchange, Inc. (“SoundExchange”), the entity that
collects certain royalties for broadcasts by webcasters, defines “[a] commercial webcaster/broadcast simulcaster” as:
a noninteractive, nonsubscription digital audio transmission service
that provides audio programming consisting, in whole or in part, of
performances of sound recordings, including retransmissions of
broadcast transmissions. The primary purpose of the service must be
to provide audio or other entertainment programming and not to sell,
advertise, or promote particular products or services other than sound
recordings, live concerts, or other music-related events. To be “non-
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fies as a “noncommercial webcaster.” 7 Needless to say, my access
to WFUV’s noncommercial programming through online streaming has only enhanced my exposure to and appreciation both for
the station, and, by extension, its featured artists.
In March, 2007 the Copyright Royalty Board of the U.S. Copyright Office handed down “its decision on 2006–2010 royalties for
the use of sound recordings when streaming music on the Internet
by Internet radio stations and other non-interactive streaming services operating under the statutory license.” 8 “[U]nless there is a
subsequent settlement or a successful appeal [of the Copyright
Royalty Board’s decision,] royalty rates [for webcasting] are going
to rise significantly over the next few years.” 9 For instance, under
the old rate, noncommercial radio entities paid a flat fee for
interactive,” a service may not offer “on-demand” access to individual sound recordings or offer programs that are “specially created for
the recipient.” Playing requests does not make a service interactive
provided that the service does not substantially consist of sound recordings that are performed within one hour of the time they are requested or at a designated time.
SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “Service Provider” hyperlink
under “Where Do I Start?” column; then follow “Commercial Webcasters/Simulcasters”
hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 16, 2008).
7
After providing the definition of a “commercial webcaster/broadcaster simulcaster,”
see supra note 6, SoundExchange defines “[a] ‘noncommercial webcaster/broadcast
simulcaster’” as:
any webcaster/simulcaster that: 1. is exempt from taxation under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. [§] 501); 2.
has applied in good faith to the Internal Revenue Service for exemption from taxation under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code
and has a commercially reasonable expectation that such exemption
shall be granted; or 3. is operated by a State or possession or any
governmental entity or subordinate thereof, or by the United States or
District of Columbia, for exclusively public purposes.
SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “Service Provider” hyperlink
under “Where Do I Start?” column; then follow “Noncommercial Webcasters/Simulcasters” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). “WFUV is exempt . . . from
Federal income tax under Section 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code.”
WFUV-FM (A NONCOMMERCIAL, EDUCATIONAL FM STATION OWNED AND OPERATED BY
FORDHAM UNIVERSITY), FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 6 (2007) (financial statements as of June
30, 2006 and 2005, audited by KPMG), available at http://www.wfuv.org/
about/financials2005.pdf.
8
David D. Oxenford, Copyright Royalty Board Releases Music Royalties for Internet
Radio Streaming for 2006–2010—Clarifying the Confusion (June 20, 2007),
http://www.dwt.com/practc/broadcast/bulletins/04-07_CRBDecision.htm
[hereinafter
Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion].
9
Id.
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streaming which permitted them to stream up to a capped number
of hours. 10 If they exceeded those hours, they paid a royalty rate
that was one-third the rate at which commercial broadcasters were
required to pay. 11 “In the Board’s new decision, streaming [by
noncommercial webcasters] in excess of the threshold would be
paid at full commercial rates.” 12 “Thus, by 2010, the royalties will
be approximately nine times as high as they were in 2005” for noncommercial webcasters who exceed the designated cap. 13 Simply
put, the dramatic rate increases imposed by the Copyright Royalty
Board threaten the vitality of the Internet broadcasts of stations like
WFUV, and countless other webcasters of comparable programming, both commercial and noncommercial alike. 14
This Comment proposes to examine the propriety of the Copyright Royalty Board’s March 2007 rate determination proceeding
for the performance of sound recordings by webcasters. Part I introduces the statutory and case law background leading up to the
Copyright Royalty Board’s rate determination proceeding. Part II
outlines and critiques the Copyright Royalty Board’s March 2007
Decision. Part III proposes a solution to the difficulties posed by
the Copyright Royalty Board’s rate determination, ultimately advising the legislature to consider reform of the statutory standards
underlying the Copyright Royalty Board’s March 2007 Decision.
Finally, an Addendum was added to this Comment to appraise the
reader of major legislative developments on the subject matter ad-

10

Id.
See id.
12
See id.
13
Id. (emphasis added).
14
See, e.g., WFUV Public Radio—Streaming and Copyright Laws/Fees,
http://www.wfuv.org/audio/copyright.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008); Celia Hirschman,
Cloudy Issues Surround Internet Radio, On the Beat, KCRW (July 4, 2007),
http://www.kcrw.com/etc/programs/ob/ob070704cloudy_issues_surrou; Posting by Eliot
Van Buskirk to Wired Listening Post Blog, Pandora Could Be First Major Casualty of
New Royalty Rates, http://blog.wired.com/music/2008/08/pandora-could-b.html (Aug. 18,
2008, 01:32:03 PM); see also Hiawatha Bray, Internet Radio Firms Say Royalties
Limiting Choices, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/
business/technology/articles/2008/03/14/internet_radio_firms_say_royalties_limiting_
choices; KCBX Public Radio, Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to
Stream Music Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2008); SaveNetRadio, http://www.savenetradio.org/about/index.html (last
visited Sep. 3, 2008).
11

VOL19_BOOK1_CAREY

262

12/3/2008 12:42:03 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:257

dressed by this Comment that arose as the Comment was going to
print.

I. SLOW TRAIN COMING: THE EVOLUTION OF A PERFORMANCE
RIGHT IN SOUND RECORDINGS
A. The Historical Absence of a Sound Recording Performance
Right
The Copyright Act of 1976 15 sets out several broad types of
“original works of authorship” that are entitled to copyright protection. 16 Among these types of authorship are the closely related,
but distinguishable categories of “musical works” 17 and “sound recordings.” 18 “Copyright law affords each of these different aspects
of music protection in recognition of the distinctive skills and individuality involved in their creation.” 19 A “musical work” can be
considered as the original melody, harmony, rhythm or lyrics of a
composition, taken “individually or in combination.” 20 The Copyright Act defines “[s]ound recordings” separately as “works that
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other
sounds . . . regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in
which they are embodied.” 21 The copyright in the sound recording
“does not attach to the underlying work per se, but only to the au15

Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332
(2006)) [hereinafter The Copyright Act].
16
17 U.S.C. § 102; In the Matter of Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
and Ephemeral Recordings, Final Determination of Rates and Terms
[hereinafter CRB Final Determination], 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380), available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/20051/final-rates-terms2005-1.pdf.
17
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).
18
Id. § 102(a)(7); see CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; see also 17
U.S.C. § 101 (clarifying that the types of authorship are “illustrative and not limitative”).
19
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 424 (4th ed. Aspen Publishers 2006).
20
Id. at 424–25; see CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; see also H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666–67 (noting that the Copyright Act does not specifically define the category of “musical works”
because it is thought to have a “fairly settled meaning[]”).
21
17 U.S.C. § 101. Note however, that sounds that accompany a motion picture do not
qualify as “sound recordings.” Id.
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ral version of such work” in whatever medium the work is fixated. 22 So, for instance, a Frank Sinatra recording of a song written by Cole Porter would implicate two copyrights: a musical work
copyright for Mr. Porter’s underlying composition, and an entirely
separate sound recording copyright for the specific fixation of
sound that comprises Mr. Sinatra’s recording of Mr. Porter’s
song. 23 “[T]he musical composition copyright is typically owned
by a musical publisher, while the sound recording copyright is
typically owned by a record company.” 24
Copyright protection itself subsists in a veritable bundle of
“exclusive rights” granted to the copyright owner. 25 Among these
is the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly,” 26 typically
referred to as the performance right. 27 Originally the Copyright
Act specified that the right of performance applied only to “literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works . . . .” 28 This enumeration of copyrightable works entitled to a performance right
22

1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.10[A][2]
(MB 2008).
23
See id. at n.23. By extension, a separate recording of Mr. Porter’s song, say by Dean
Martin, would make use of the same musical work, but result in a sound recording copyright entirely separate from that of Mr. Sinatra’s. See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 24,086. To throw a further wrinkle into the equation “[o]nly sound recordings
that were ‘fixed’ (i.e., first embodied in a phonorecord) on or after February 15, 1972, are
eligible for statutory copyright.” 1-2 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 2.10 [A][1]. As such, the
preceding hypotheticals presume sound recordings produced on or after the relevant date.
24
1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:160 (West 2008); see CRB Final
Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.
25
17 U.S.C. § 106; see CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24086; MERGES ET
AL., supra note 19, at 458.
26
17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
To perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means—(1) to perform . . . it at a
place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance . . . of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of
the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in the
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times.
Id. § 101.
27
See, e.g., CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; MERGES ET AL., supra
note 19, at 498.
28
17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
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left a conspicuous absence. “At its enactment in 1976, the Copyright Act was explicit in disallowing owners of sound recording
copyrights from asserting any performance interest therein.” 29
This was no oversight. By the time a sound recording copyright was created in 1972, radio broadcasters had enough political
influence to persuade Congress to exclude sound recordings from
claiming a performance right. 30 This allowed broadcasters to
avoid paying performance royalties for broadcasts 31 of sound recordings on top of the performance royalties they already had to
pay to the owners of copyright in the underlying musical compositions for broadcasts of their work. 32 As a result, to return to our
earlier example, when a traditional AM or FM radio station broadcasts a post-1972 Frank Sinatra recording of a Cole Porter composition, only Mr. Porter receives a royalty as compensation for the
performance. 33 This is because, while Mr. Porter’s copyrighted
musical work enjoys a performance right, Mr. Sinatra’s sound recording copyright does not. 34
Though seemingly lopsided, this arrangement prevailed largely
due to its creation of a “symbiotic relationship” between broadcasters and record labels. 35 Record labels recognized that radio
airtime was tantamount to free advertising for their sound recordings, which helped drive customers to retail outlets to purchase

29

2-8 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 8.14[A].
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 566; see also William H. O’Dowd, The Need
for a Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 249, 253–54
(1994).
31
The Copyright Act defines “[a] ‘broadcast’ transmission” as “a transmission made
by a terrestrial broadcast station licensed as such by the Federal Communications Commission.” 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(3). As such, Internet radio transmissions are not considered
broadcasts.
32
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 500. In actuality, Mr. Porter’s publisher would
most likely receive the royalty as owner of the copyright in his musical work. See supra
note 24 and accompanying text. Royalty payment to musical composition copyright
owners is “typically handled through blanket licenses—permission to publicly perform an
[sic] song from a vast catalog in exchange for a fee based on the scale of the business activity—administered by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP), Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI), or Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC).” MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 498 n.28.
33
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 498 n.28 and accompanying text.
34
See 2-8 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 8.14[A].
35
See Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487 (3d Cir. 2003).
30
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albums. 36 Broadcasters, on the other hand, enjoyed the listenership these sound recordings brought their stations without the burden of having to pay the record industry licensing fees for the performance of its sound recordings.37
B. The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995
Record labels, deprived of a significant potential revenue
stream, nevertheless tried repeatedly to secure a performance right
for their copyrighted works. 38 These efforts continuously failed to
pass Congress. 39 This effort reached a pitch in the mid-1990s,
with the advent and increasing influence of digital technology and
the Internet. 40 “The advance of digital recording technology and
the prospect of digital transmission capabilities created the possibility that consumers would soon have access to services whereby
they could pay for high quality digital audio transmissions (subscription services) or even pay for specific songs to be played on
demand (interactive services).” 41
The proliferation of such services led to concern in the recording industry that its “traditional balance . . . with . . . broadcasters would be disturbed and that new, alternative paths for consumers to purchase recorded music (in ways that cut out the
recording industry’s products) would erode sales of recorded music.” 42 The recording industry responded by advocating for the
36

See id.
See id. at 488.
38
See id.
39
See id.; 4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 14:81 (noting failed attempts at legislative reform
in 1969, 1975, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1991 and 1993).
40
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 566; Bonneville, 347 F.3d at 488.
41
Bonneville, 347 F.3d at 488. The Copyright Act itself defines a “‘subscription’
transmission” as “a transmission that is controlled and limited to particular recipients, and
for which consideration is required to be paid or otherwise given by or on behalf of the
recipient to receive the transmission or a package of transmissions including the transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 114 (j)(14) (2006). In addition, the Copyright Act defines an “‘interactive service’” as “one that enables a member of the public to receive a transmission
of a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part of a program, which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient.” Id. § 114(j)(7). The Copyright Act’s definition of “interactive services” does not generally include services that allow individuals “to request that
particular sound recordings be performed.” Id.
42
Bonneville, 347 F.3d at 488.
37
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creation of a performance right that would apply exclusively to
performances transmitted by way of these emerging digital technologies. 43 Traditional broadcasters joined the recording industry
in supporting the creation of such a right because it would “impose
a new licensing requirement (and cost) upon potential new competitors.” 44 The fledgling Internet music industry lacked the massive political clout that traditional broadcasters had wielded in successfully opposing a performance right for sound recordings.45
Congress, however, “sought to ensure that the new right would not
unduly interfere with the development of new digital transmission
business models.” 46 The resulting compromise was the creation, at
long last, of a performance right for sound recordings, albeit a limited one. 47 In 1995, the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (“DPRA”), 48 amended the Copyright Act by adding
section 106(6) which gave the owners of sound recording copyrights the exclusive right to perform their sound recordings “publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.” 49 In essence, this
provision created a “digital performance right.” 50
To qualify for this exclusive right, a performance of a sound
recording essentially needs to meet three requirements: it “must be
(a) in digital form, (b) audio-only, and (c) a transmission.” 51 With
regards to the first requirement, “[a] ‘digital transmission’ is a
transmission in whole or in part in a digital or other non-analog
format.” 52 Effectively this maintains the status quo; a broadcast of
a sound recording on traditional AM or FM radio still does not
constitute a compensable performance under the Copyright Act af-

43

See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 566–67.
Id.
45
See id. at 567; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
46
MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 567.
47
See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
48
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
49
17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006).
50
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.
51
Bob Kohn, A Primer on the Law of Webcasting and Digital Music Delivery, 20 (4)
ENT. L. REP. 4 (Sept. 1998).
52
17 U.S.C. § 101.
44
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ter the enactment of the DPRA. 53 Secondly, the requirement that
the transmission be “audio-only” intimates that no visual content
accompany the transmission of sound, as, for instance, occurs in a
music video. 54 This is because such works already have a performance right under the Copyright Act. 55 Finally, with respect to
the requirement that the performance be a “transmission,” 56 the
Copyright Act provides that “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance . . . is to
communicate it by any device or process whereby images or
sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.” 57
Effectively then, “rendering a live performance” of a digital sound
recording in a single location through “the use of a megaphone or
loudspeakers” 58 would not constitute a “digital audio transmission.” 59
The DPRA did not, however, extend the digital performance
right to all types of digital audio transmissions. 60 The legislation
itself was intended as “a narrowly crafted response” to concerns
expressed by the recording industry “namely that certain types of
subscription and interaction audio services might adversely affect
sales of sound recordings and erode copyright owners’ ability to
control and be paid for use of their work.” 61 Indeed, the digital
performance right was “limited by the creation of a statutory license for certain non-exempt, non-interactive subscription services” as well as for “preexisting satellite digital audio radio services” both of which make use of digital audio transmissions. 62
These are what the Copyright Act presently defines as “preexisting
53
See Kohn, supra note 51. Moreover, “[t]raditional television and radio broadcasters
may continue to perform sound recordings without being subject to this new [performance] right, even if they convert their signal to digital form.” MERGES ET AL., supra note
19, at 567 n.33; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1).
54
Kohn, supra note 51.
55
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (providing the exclusive right of performance to owners of
copyright in “audiovisual works”); Kohn, supra note 51.
56
Kohn, supra note 51.
57
17 U.S.C. § 101.
58
Kohn, supra note 51.
59
17 U.S.C. § 106(6); see also id. § 114(j)(5).
60
See Kohn, supra note 51 (explaining that the provisions of the DPRA did not include webcasting); see also 4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 14:29.
61
H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13 (1995) (emphasis added).
62
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
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subscription services” 63 and “preexisting satellite digital radio services.” 64
The statutory license essentially allows these services to make
their digital audio transmissions without directly having to obtain
“consent from, or having to negotiate license fees with, copyright
owners of the sound recordings they perform.” 65 To achieve these
ends, “Congress established procedures to facilitate voluntary negotiation of rates and terms including a provision authorizing
copyright owners and services to designate common agents on a
nonexclusive basis—as well as to pay, to collect, and to distribute
royalties—and a provision granting antitrust immunity for such actions.” 66 This provision eventually led to the creation of SoundExchange, Inc. (“SoundExchange”), the “independent, nonprofit performance rights organization that is designated by the U.S.
Copyright Office to collect and distribute digital performance royalties” for all digital audio transmissions of sound recordings, as
well as to participate in rate-setting proceedings. 67
If voluntary negotiations between sound recording copyright
owners or their designated agents and the subscription services
failed to yield agreement, “the Librarian of Congress was directed
63

17 U.S.C. § 114 (j)(11). “A ‘preexisting subscription service’ is a service that performs sound recordings by means of noninteractive audio-only subscription digital audio
transmissions, which was in existence and was making such transmissions to the public
for a fee on or before July 31, 1998 . . . .” Id. This would include, for example, the service Music Choice, which transmits programmed music on channels received by digital
cable network subscribers. See generally Music Choice, http://www.musicchoice.com
(last visited Oct. 28, 2008); see also 4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 14:94.
64
17 U.S.C. § 114 (j)(10). “A ‘preexisting satellite digital audio radio service’ is a
subscription satellite digital audio radio service provided pursuant to a satellite digital
audio radio service license issued by the Federal Communications Commission on or before July 31, 1998 . . . .” Id. This includes XM and Sirius Satellite Radio services, which
allow paying subscribers to receive a variety of audio content, including extensive music
programming, by way of digital satellite transmission. See generally XM Satellite Radio,
http://www.xmradio.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); Sirius Satellite Radio,
http://www.sirius.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
65
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.
66
Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(e) (“Notwithstanding any provision of the antitrust
laws . . . copyright owners of sound recordings and any entities performing sound recordings . . . may negotiate and agree upon the royalty rates and license terms and conditions for the performance of such sound recordings . . . .”).
67
SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “About” hyperlink under
column to the right; then follow “Background” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); see
4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 14:96.
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to convene a Copyright Arbitration Panel (“CARP”) to recommend
royalty rates and terms” for digital performances of sound recordings. 68 In determining the appropriate royalty rates “for the
subscription services’ statutory license,” Congress provided that
the CARP should set out to achieve “the policy objectives in section 801(b)(1) of the Copyright Act” (“801(b)(1) standard”). 69 In
effect then, the CARP would be asked to set royalty rates that seek:
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works
to the public.
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for
his or her creative work and the copyright user a fair
income under existing economic conditions.
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright
owner and the copyright user in the product made
available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital
investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their communication.
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices. 70
After the CARP made its determination of rates, it was to recommend its determination to the Librarian of Congress, who, on
the advice of the Register of Copyrights, was free to either reject or
accept the decision of the CARP. 71 In the event of a rejection, the
Librarian was to substitute his own determination of rates based
upon the record of the arbitration. 72 Once the final rate determination was set, under the DPRA copyright owners were to allocate

68

CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.
Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 114.
70
17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A)–(D).
71
Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings [hereinafter Webcaster I LoC Determination], 67
Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,242 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261).
72
Id.
69
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half “of the statutory licensing royalties that they receive from the
subscriptions services to [sound] recording artists.” 73
While the DPRA set out extensive provisions for the licensing
of the digital performance right of sound recordings by subscription services, the DPRA did not address digital audio transmissions
made by nonsubscription, 74 noninteractive services 75 such as webcasting. 76 Technology continued to evolve rapidly. In 1995, the
year the DPRA was passed, software developer Progressive Networks released RealAudio, “the first technology for streaming audio” content over the Internet. 77 The technology greatly facilitated
the rise and proliferation of webcasting, “since anyone with a personal computer could set up their own Internet ‘radio station,’ and
anyone with free RealAudio software could tune in.”78 While noninteractive “pure webcasting” was not covered by the DPRA, some
websites began offering users customized content based on individual preference, as well as archived webcasts on demand. 79
These sites began to call into question what exactly qualifies as a
noninteractive service. 80 As a whole, webcasters maintained that
their noninteractive, nonsubscription services were not subject to
the digital performance right under the DPRA. 81
The recording industry, however, perhaps frustrated by the
limitations of the DPRA, countered with a different position. 82
73

CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.
The Copyright Act simply defines a “‘nonsubscription’ transmission” as “any transmission that is not a subscription transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(9); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(j)(14) (defining a subscription service); supra text accompanying note 41.
75
The Copyright Act does not offer an independent definition of “noninteractive services.” See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j); see also id. at § 114(j)(7) (defining an “interactive service”); supra text accompanying note 41.
76
See Kohn, supra note 51; 4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 1:104 (explaining that the
DPRA didn’t apply to webcasters); see also Recent Legislation, supra note 6, at 1920
n.2.; supra text accompanying note 6 (defining webcasts as “noninteractive, nonsubscription” services); Steve Gordon, Update on Webcasting Royalty Rates Part I of II,
ENT. L. & FIN., August, 2004, available at http://www.stevegordonlaw.com/
update_webcast_royalty_rates.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
77
Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution is Ready to Begin, as Soon as
We Figure Out The Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 12 (2001).
78
Delchin, supra note 2, at 354.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.; see also Craft, supra note 77, at 12.
74
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The Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), the
U.S. recording industry’s trade association, 83 argued that webcasters were indeed subject to the DPRA’s digital performance
right, and as such should be paying royalties for the performance
of its copyrighted material on the Internet. 84
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Around the same time that the RIAA was arguing that webcasters were subject to the DPRA’s digital performance right,
Congress was in the middle of drafting the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 85 primarily aimed at bringing the U.S.
Copyright Act into harmony with World Intellectual Property Organization treaties concerning “Internet piracy and security.” 86
The recording industry sought to take advantage of the opportunity, intensely lobbying Congress to add language to the Copyright
Act that would eliminate any uncertainty as to whether noninteractive, nonsubscription webcasting was subject to the digital performance right. 87 The recording industry backed its bark with bite,
threatening litigation and vowing to withhold its copyrighted content if Congress declined to insert such revisions into the Copyright
Act. 88
“In an effort to appease the RIAA, Congress permitted a lastminute hearing on the matter.” 89 The prominent players in the
equation were hastily gathered in 1998. 90 The Digital Media Association (“DiMA”), digital media’s recently formed trade association, represented webcasters. 91 “On Thursday, July 23, 1998” the
RIAA and DiMA “met with the U.S. Copyright Office . . . and
were told by the Register of Copyrights that they had until the following Friday, July 31, 1998, to draft the legislation” that the
83

RIAA—Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
Kohn, supra note 51.
85
Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
86
Craft, supra note 77, at 13.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
See id. at 12; see also Kohn, supra note 51.
84
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RIAA was seeking. 92 DiMA found itself in a difficult position.
Even if DiMA was able to defeat the legislative amendment proposed by the RIAA, it would still be subject to the RIAA’s threatened litigation, which, at the very least would impose a huge cost
on the growing industry. 93 “Therefore, instead of fighting the
amendment, DiMA negotiated a simpler compulsory licensing
process—paying royalties to a single entity, [eventually to become
SoundExchange] and not having to negotiate individually with
each individual copyright holder.” 94 In somewhat miraculous
fashion, “on August 4, 1998, the House of Representatives passed
an amendment to the [DMCA] which included the legislation
drafted and agreed upon by the RIAA and DiMA just days, and
perhaps hours, earlier.” 95 The “eleventh hour” amendment, made
it into the DMCA “without House or Senate debate,” and was
signed into law by President Clinton in October of 1998. 96
Under the DMCA the scope of the DPRA’s digital performance right was broadened to include “digital transmissions and retransmissions, typically referred to as webcasting.” 97 However,
the DMCA also expanded the “statutory license for digital audio
transmission of sound recordings.” 98 Under the DMCA, webcasters who “transmit/retransmit sound recordings on an interactive basis” are ineligible for statutory licensing and have to directly
“obtain the consent of, and negotiate fees with, individual owners”
of sound recordings. 99 On the other hand, the DMCA provided
that webcasters who stream digital audio transmissions on a nonsubscription, noninteractive basis would be “eligible for statutory
licensing” 100 much as “non-interactive, subscription services and
preexisting satellite digital audio radio services” were under the
DPRA. 101 In essence then, by enacting the DMCA Congress cre92

Kohn, supra note 51.
Delchin, supra note 2, at 357.
94
Id.
95
Kohn, supra note 51.
96
Craft, supra note 77, at 15; see Delchin, supra note 2, at 357.
97
See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,086 (May 1, 2007) (codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
98
Id.; see also 1 PATRY, supra note 24, § 1:104 (explaining that the DMCA expanded
the provisions of the DPRA to include webcasters).
99
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.
100
Id.
101
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 60.
93

VOL19_BOOK1_CAREY

2008]

12/3/2008 12:42:03 PM

INTERNET RADIO: COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD RATE DECISION

273

ated a new “statutory license” in § 114 of the Copyright Act for a
distinct group of digital audio transmissions: “‘eligible nonsubscription transmissions,’ which include[s] non-interactive
transmissions of sound recordings by webcasters” (“§ 114 webcaster performance license”). 102 In order to qualify for this statutory license, “the webcaster must comply with several” distinct
technical requirements. 103
To determine rates for the webcaster’s statutory license, the
DMCA “adopted the . . . voluntary negotiation and arbitration pro102

CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2), 114(f)(2)
(2006).
103
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086. A laundry list of these requirements provides:
(1) Webcasters must adhere to the “sound recording performance
complement” originally established under the DPRA. This prohibits
a webcaster from playing in any three-hour period more than three
songs from the same album and more than two songs consecutively,
or more than four different songs from the same artist or from any
compilation. (2) The song, album, and featured artist must be textually identified on the user's software program while the song is being
played; however, (3) advanced song or artist playlists may not be
published. DJs can use “teasers” to identify which artists will be
played, but they cannot specify the time a particular song will be
played. (4) If the program is archived on the webcaster's website and
made on-demand, it must be at least five hours in duration. The rationale [being] that a user is not willing to sit through a five hour rebroadcast in order to hear a particular song repeated again. Also, the
archive may be made available only for a period of two weeks. (5) If
the program is continuously looped (i.e., immediately re-played upon
conclusion), it must be at least three hours in duration. This makes it
more difficult to repeatedly tune in to particular songs. (6) Scheduled
programs (i.e., songs announced in advance) of less than one hour in
duration can only be transmitted three times in any two-week period,
or four times for programs longer than one hour in duration. (7) The
webcaster cannot suggest a connection in any way between the artist
and any particular product or service (i.e., deceptive advertising). For
example, the same advertisement displayed every time a particular
song is played may suggest a misleading connection. (8) Webcasters
have to take proactive steps to defeat copyright infringement if they
are aware of such copying and have the technological capacity to
prevent it, such as disabling copying features available through the
service. (9) A webcaster may not intentionally switch channels from
one program to another. For example, if a user is listening to one
genre of music, the webcaster is prohibited from switching the channel to another genre.
Delchin, supra note 2, at 358–59.
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cedures” established under the DPRA for satellite and subscription
services. 104 Thus, if the interested parties were unable to voluntarily agree on a licensing fee for webcasting, the CARP, once again,
was to be convened to determine and recommend to the Librarian
of Congress a fair value for these services. 105 Significantly, however, while the DMCA left the DPRA’s rate setting procedure in
place, “it changed the statutory standard for determining rates and
terms.” 106 Rather than seeking to achieve the policy objectives articulated in the 801(b)(1) standard, in setting the statutory license
rate for webcasting, the CARP was to determine what “most
clearly represents the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing
seller” (“willing buyer/willing seller standard”). 107 “The criteria
for setting rates and terms for the § 114 webcaster performance license [were] enunciated under 17 U.S.C. [§] 114(f)(2)(B),” which
presently, in slightly amended form provides:
Such rates and terms shall distinguish among the
different types of eligible nonsubscription transmission services then in operation and shall include a
minimum fee for each such type of service, such
differences to be based on criteria including, but not
limited to, the quantity and nature of the use of
sound recordings and the degree to which use of the
service may substitute for or may promote the purchase of phonorecords by consumers. In establishing rates and terms for transmissions by eligible
nonsubscription services and new subscription services, the Copyright Royalty Judges shall establish
rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates
and terms that would have been negotiated in the
marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing
seller. In determining such rates and terms, the
Copyright Royalty Judges shall base its decision on

104

CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; see supra text accompanying
notes 60–73.
105
See Delchin, supra note 2, at 358; 17 U.S.C. § 114(e), 114(f).
106
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086 (emphasis added).
107
17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B); see CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.
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economic, competitive and programming information presented by the parties, including—
(i) whether use of the service may substitute for or
may promote the sales of phonorecords or otherwise
may interfere with or may enhance the sound recording copyright owner’s other streams of revenue
from its sound recordings; and
(ii) the relative roles of the copyright owner and the
transmitting entity in the copyrighted work and the
service made available to the public with respect to
relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk. 108
Congress further provided that “[i]n establishing such rates and
terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges may consider the rates and
terms for comparable types of digital audio transmission services
and comparable circumstances under voluntary license agreements.” 109
“Congress also recognized that webcasters who avail themselves of the [§] 114 webcaster performance license may need to
make one or more temporary or ‘ephemeral’ copies of a sound recording in order to facilitate the transmission of that recording.” 110
This involves the right of reproduction, an entirely different exclusive right than the right of performance, 111 which essentially provides the owner of a copyrighted work the exclusive right to make
a copy of that work. 112 Unlike the right of performance, sound recordings, subject to a few enumerated exceptions, “enjoy the full
scope of the reproduction right” under the Copyright Act. 113 “Accordingly Congress created a new statutory license in [§] 112(e)”
for copies of sound recordings that webcasters may have to make
in the process of webcasting (“§ 112 ephemeral license”). 114
“Congress retained the DPRA voluntary negotiation and arbitration
108

CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,087 (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
114(f)(2)(B)).
109
17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B).
110
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086.
111
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 500.
112
Id. at 459.
113
4 PATRY, supra note 24, § 11:18.
114
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086; 17 U.S.C. § 112(e).
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procedures for the § 112 ephemeral license. Congress again applied the willing buyer/willing seller standard applicable to the §
114 webcaster performance license. The webcasting and ephemeral statutory licenses created by the DMCA [were] the subject” of
the March, 2007 decision that is the focus of this Comment. 115
D. Webcaster I
The two licenses created by the DMCA were the subject of one
prior proceeding (“Webcaster I”). 116 Twenty-six webcasters were
able to reach voluntary licensing agreements with the RIAA in the
wake of the DMCA. 117 In July, 1999, the RIAA petitioned the Librarian of Congress to convene a CARP to determine “industrywide rates for webcasters with whom it had not yet completed
agreements.” 118 The CARP released its determination three years
later. 119 In the interim, National Public Radio (“NPR”), which had
litigated on behalf of public radio in Webcaster I, reached a voluntary settlement agreement with the RIAA, which covered all NPR
member and Corporation for Public Broadcasting (“CPB”) qualified webcasters through 2004. 120 The NPR settlement did not apply to the remaining non-CPB affiliated noncommercial web-

115

CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086–87. While the language of the §
114 webcaster’s performance license and the § 112 ephemeral license “varies in minor
respects . . . the criteria for setting rates and terms [are] essentially identical.” Id. at
24,087–88.
116
Id. at 24,087; Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240 (July 8, 2002)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261).
117
Recent Legislation, supra note 6, at 1922; see Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,107, 52,108 (Sept. 27, 1999).
118
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 52,108.
119
Id.; In the Matter of Rate Setting for Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Report of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panel
[hereinafter
Webcaster
I
CARP
Report]
(Feb.
20,
2002),
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates.pdf.
120
KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream Music Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Aug. 16,
2008); see Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,258. “A non-CPB, noncommercial broadcaster is a Public Broadcasting Entity as defined in 17 U.S.C. [§]
118(g) that is not qualified to receive funding from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting pursuant to the criteria set forth in 47 U.S.C. [§] 396.” Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,243 n.12.
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casters in the proceedings, and hence the CARP was left to determine a rate for these services. 121
Recognizing the “extraordinary challenge” of setting a rate for
noncommercial webcasters under the willing buyer/willing seller
standard, the CARP noted that “[a]pplying the same commercial
broadcaster rate to non-commercial entities affronts common
sense.” 122 At the RIAA’s proposal, the CARP reluctantly agreed
to subject noncommercial webcasters to a per-performance of
copyrighted material rate 123 that was one-third the rate set for
commercial webcasters, the alternative being to subject noncommercial webcasters to full commercial rates. 124 Hence, whereas
the CARP recommended that commercial webcasters pay at a rate
of 0.07¢ per-performance, the CARP also recommended that noncommercial entities pay one-third that rate, or 0.02¢ perperformance, rounded to the nearest hundredth. 125
In his review of the CARP’s decision (“Webcaster I LoC Determination”), the Librarian of Congress revised some of the
CARP’s findings. 126 Whereas the CARP had suggested a distinction between webcasts that were Internet-only transmissions and
webcasts that were merely broadcast radio retransmissions, the Librarian of Congress rejected this distinction, and concluded that
both of these types of transmissions should be subject to the same

121

See Webcaster I CARP Report, supra note 119, at 89.
Id.
123
Per-performance, “i.e. [requiring] a payment for each song as heard by
each listener.” Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. “A performance is defined as a single song, heard by a single listener. Thus, if a webcaster streams 10 songs
in an hour to a single listener, there have been 10 performances during that period. If
there were two listeners to those 10 songs, there would have been 20 performances.” Id.
124
Webcaster I CARP Report, supra note 119, at 93.
125
Id. This rate was essentially for non-commercial broadcaster’s “simulcasts” or
Internet retransmissions of AM/FM broadcasts. Id. Furthermore, whereas the CARP had
recommended that commercial entities be charged a higher rate for webcast transmissions
of Internet only content (0.14¢ per-performance), the CARP likewise recommended that
noncommercial entities be charged one-third of this adjusted rate (0.05¢ perperformance) for its transmissions of Internet only content, namely archived webcasts,
and the operation of up to two Internet-only side channels. Id. at 93–94. Any additional
side channels the noncommercial webcaster may host would be subject to the full commercial non-radio simulcast rate of 0.14¢ per performance. Id. at 94.
126
See Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,259 (July 8, 2002)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261).
122
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webcasting rate. 127 However, in essence the Librarian of Congress
adopted much of the CARP’s recommendations with regard to
transmissions made by noncommercial stations, setting the webcasting rate for the noncommercial entities at one-third that of their
commercial counterparts. 128
Many small commercial webcasters felt that the rates ultimately set by the Librarian of Congress were too high. The CARP
had set its rates using a willing buyer/willing seller model based
largely on a settlement agreement between Yahoo! and the RIAA,
whereby Yahoo! paid the RIAA a lump sum of $1.25 million for
its first one and a half billion transmissions. 129 Although the Librarian of Congress set rates that were on the whole lower than
what the CARP had recommended, he, like the CARP, also made
the questionable assumption “that a voluntary rate agreement between RIAA and one of the largest webcasters in the market would
also be appropriate for the smallest webcasters in the market.” 130
In reality, however, small commercial webcasters have a much
lower per-performance revenue than do large commercial webcasters, such as Yahoo!. 131 As a result, small commercial webcasters began shutting down in droves after the Librarian of Congress’ determination in Webcaster I. 132 Many small commercial
webcasters, however, also began complaining to Congress, and

127

See Delchin, supra note 2, at 376.
See Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,259. The Librarian thus
adopted the CARP’s recommendations for a 0.02¢ per performance rate for Internet simulcasts of noncommercial radio broadcasts. Id. However, since the Librarian of Congress had done away with the CARP’s distinction between Internet-only webcasts and
webcasts that were merely retransmissions of radio broadcasts, it likewise did away with
the CARP’s recommendation of a higher rate for the latter, and subjected both of these
transmissions to a 0.07¢ per performance rate for commercial entities. Id. By extension,
noncommercial stations were subject to a downward adjustment from the CARP’s recommendation of 0.05¢ per performance of Internet-only content (archived webcasts and
up to two side channels) to a rate of 0.02¢ per performance of Internet-only content,
again one-third of the 0.07¢ per performance rate for commercial entities for the same
services. Id.
129
Delchin, supra note 2, at 376.
130
Id. at 377.
131
See id.
132
See id. Many noncommercial stations also stopped streaming after Webcaster I as
well. See Public Stations Now Offline, RADIO & INTERNET NEWSL., Aug. 8, 2002,
http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/080802/index.shtml.
128
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noncommercial webcasters, not entirely satisfied by the Librarian
of Congress’ ultimate determination, joined the chorus. 133
E. The Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002
Congress was swift in action, responding to concerns by passing the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002 (“SWSA”). 134
“The SWSA provide[d] temporary relief to noncommercial webcasters and small webcasters” 135 and was met with general approval from both sides of the debate. 136 The SWSA itself did not
set rates or terms for webcasting entities.137 Rather the SWSA authorized SoundExchange, acting on behalf of the RIAA, and an
agent of the Librarian of Congress to enter into “agreements, on
behalf of all copyright owners and performers for the purpose of
establishing an alternative payment structure for small commercial
webcasters and noncommercial webcasters operating under” the §
112 [ephemeral] license and the § 114 webcaster performance license. 138 To achieve these ends, the SWSA provided that any royalty rates and terms reached in such agreements “shall be considered as a compromise motivated by the unique business, economic
and political contributions of small webcasters rather than as matters that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a
willing buyer and a willing seller.” 139 However, the rates and
terms of agreements made under the SWSA were to apply only to
133

See Emily D. Harwood, Note, Staying Afloat in the Internet Stream: How to Keep
Web Radio from Drowning in Digital Copyright Royalties, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 673, 687
(2004); KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream
Music Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Aug.
16, 2008); Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8. Although the Librarian of
Congress set noncommercial rates at one-third that of commercial entities, noncommercial stations were in fact seeking a rate that was one-thirty fourth of that for commercial
entities. Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. at 45,258.
134
Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see Recent Legislation, supra
note 6, at 1924.
135
Matt Jackson, From Broadcast to Webcast: Copyright Law and Streaming Media,
11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 447, 469 (2003).
136
Kurt Hanson, Congress Passes SWSA!, RADIO & INTERNET NEWSL., Nov. 15, 2002,
v.2, http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/111502/index.shtml.
137
Delchin, supra note 2, at 377.
138
Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 68
Fed. Reg. 35,008, 35,008 (June 11, 2003) (emphasis added).
139
Id. at 35,009 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(5)(C)).

VOL19_BOOK1_CAREY

280

12/3/2008 12:42:03 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:257

the time periods specified in those agreements and were to be
given no precedential effect in any future rate-setting proceedings. 140 While nothing compelled the RIAA to come to new
agreements with webcasters under the terms of the SWSA, if no
agreements were reached the rates set by the Librarian of Congress
would take effect. 141
Significantly for small commercial entities, the SWSA provided that any agreement with small webcasters must include a
provision allowing these entities to pay royalties on a percentage of
revenue or percentage of expenses basis, rather than on a perperformance basis. 142 Also with regards to both small webcasters
and noncommercial webcasters, the SWSA provided a “grace period for back payment of royalties . . . .” 143 Under these circumstances small webcasters were able to reach an agreement with
SoundExchange in December of 2002. 144 The agreement for small
webcasters reached under the SWSA, defined a small webcaster on
a revenue scale graduated by calendar year. 145 Under the most recent definition, a small webcaster is one whose revenues do not
exceed $1.25 million a year. 146 As for rates, the most recent provisions of the SWSA provide that an eligible small webcaster must
pay ten percent of its first $250,000 in gross revenues and twelve
percent of any gross revenues beyond that in a given year. 147
However, in the event that a small webcaster were to earn “little or
no revenue, a percentage of expenses (seven percent) would be
paid as a minimum fee if that figure exceeded the applicable percentage of revenues.” 148 “In addition, [under the SWSA] each
[small] webcaster is required to maintain and provide arduous and
140

Id. at 35,008.
Delchin, supra note 2, at 378.
142
See Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, sec. 4, § 114(f),
116 Stat. 2780, 2781–82; Delchin, supra note 2, at 378.
143
Delchin, supra note 2, at 378; see Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-321, sec. 3(a)(1), (b)(1), § 114, 116 Stat. 2780, 2781.
144
See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002,
67 Fed. Reg. 78,510 (Dec. 24, 2002), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
fedreg/2002/67fr78510.html; Delchin, supra note 2, at 379.
145
See Delchin, supra note 2, at 379.
146
See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002,
67 Fed. Reg. at 78,513.
147
See id. at 78,511.
148
Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8; see Delchin, supra note 2, at 379.
141
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extensive notice and recordkeeping regarding the songs that they
broadcast.” 149
With regards to noncommercial webcasters, the SWSA forestalled the payment of royalties due for the period between October
29, 1998 and May 31, 2003 until June 20, 2003. 150 With the
breathing room afforded by this grace period, noncommercial
webcasters and SoundExchange were able to reach an agreement
as to royalty rates under the SWSA on June 2, 2003. 151 Under the
agreement, noncommercial webcasters transmitting a single channel, be it a retransmission of a radio broadcast or an Internet-only
transmission, paid a flat minimum annual fee starting at $200, escalating per year up to $500 most recently. 152 Noncommercial
webcasters transmitting more than a single channel have always
had to pay a minimum fee of $500 under the agreement. 153 The
flat minimum fee covered broadcasts by noncommercial webcasters up to a cap, designated at 146,000 Aggregate Tuning
Hours 154 (“ATH”) in any month. 155 After that cap was exceeded,
149

Delchin, supra note 2, at 379.
See Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, sec. 3(a)(1), §
114, 116 Stat. 2780, 2781.
151
See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002,
68 Fed. Reg. 35,008, 35,009 (June 11, 2003).
152
See id. at 35,010. However, under the most recent rates a noncommercial webcaster,
substantially all of whose programming can “reasonably [be] classified as news, talk,
sports or business programming,” need only pay a minimum annual fee of $250. Id.
153
See id.
154
The agreement defines the term Aggregate Tuning Hours as follows:
The term “Aggregate Tuning Hours” means the total hours of programming that a Noncommercial Webcaster has transmitted during
the relevant period to all listeners within the United States over the
relevant channels or stations, and from any archived programs, that
provide audio programming consisting, in whole or in part, of eligible
nonsubscription transmissions, less the actual running time of any
sound recordings for which the Noncommercial Webcaster has obtained direct licenses apart from 17 U.S.C. [§] 114(d)(2) or which do
not require a license under United States copyright law. By way of
example, if a Noncommercial Webcaster transmitted 1 hour of programming to 10 simultaneous listeners, the Noncommercial Webcaster’s Aggregate Tuning Hours would equal 10. If three minutes of
that hour consisted of transmission of a directly licensed recording,
the Noncommercial Webcaster’s Aggregate Tuning Hours would
equal 9 hours and 30 minutes. As an additional example, if one listener listened to a Noncommercial Webcaster for 10 hours (and none
of the recordings transmitted during that time was directly licensed),
150
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noncommercial broadcasters were subject to a rate of 0.02¢ perperformance, 156 which, again, was one-third the rate for commercial broadcasters. 157 A noncommercial webcaster operating more
than three channels of programming, however, was subject to pay
for the performance of sound recordings on those channels at full
commercial rates. 158 Furthermore, the agreement removed “the
arduous recordkeeping requirements established under [the]
CARP” 159 by permitting noncommercial webcasters to avoid these
requirements by paying a fee between $25 and $50 a year. 160 This
saved noncommercial webcasters a potentially much larger expense. 161
In light of the CARP and Librarian of Congress’ determinations, “most noncommercial broadcasters regarded the agreement
[reached under the SWSA] as a victory in keeping streams from
shutting down.” 162 Indeed, in 2002 most small webcasters and
noncommercial groups felt that webcasting royalties would have
“put them out of business . . . if not for the [SWSA].” 163 The terms
of the agreements, reached under the SWSA determined rates for
small and noncommercial webcasters through December 31, 2005,
the last day prior to the beginning of the period covered by the
March 2007 rate proceedings that are the focus of this Comment. 164

the Noncommercial Webcaster’s Aggregate Tuning Hours would
equal 10.
Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 35,012.
155
See id. at 35,010.
156
See id. Alternatively, the agreement allowed noncommercial webcasters to elect to
pay a rate of 0.251¢ per ATH. Id.
157
See Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.
158
See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002,
68 Fed. Reg. at 35,011.
159
Delchin, supra note 2, at 382.
160
See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002,
68 Fed. Reg. at 35,010.
161
Delchin, supra note 2, at 382.
162
Id.
163
Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.
164
Although the SWSA, as originally drafted, was only meant to cover the period from
1998 to 2004, the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 extended the
provisions of the SWSA an extra year to cover through the end of 2005. See Copyright
Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, sec. 6(b)(3), § 118,
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F. Formation of the Copyright Royalty Board
In the time during which the SWSA has been in effect, however, the rate setting procedure for the § 114 webcaster performance license and the § 112 ephemeral license has undergone significant reform. 165 After Webcaster I and other proceedings
calling for the formation of a CARP, many parties offered criticisms of the CARP arbitration system, primarily that: “[(1)] CARP
decisions are unpredictable and inconsistent[; (2)] [a]rbitrators lack
appropriate expertise to render decisions and frequently reflect either a ‘content’ or ‘user’ bias [; and (3)] [t]he process is unnecessarily expensive.” 166 In response to these concerns Congress
passed the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004
(“Reform Act”), which replaced the copyright arbitration royalty
panels with three full-time, government-paid Copyright Royalty
Judges, appointed by the Librarian of Congress. 167 The three
judges collectively constitute the Copyright Royalty Board
(“CRB”). 168 “The royalty judges are ‘housed’ in the Library of
Congress, and after initial staggered appointments . . . serve for six
years, with the possibility of reappointment.” 169 Rate setting procedures after the Reform Act maintain “the voluntary negotiation
period that existed under the CARP system.” 170 However, if
“copyright users and carriers cannot settle on the rates or methods
to distribute royalties in private negotiations,” then under the Reform Act, the “three full-time Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs)
would replace the CARPs and make determinations on rates and
118 Stat. 2341, 2370–71; CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,106 (May 1,
2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
165
See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419,
118 Stat. 2341 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
166
H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 18 (2004). Parties to CARP arbitration proceedings had
to pay the costs of the arbitrators themselves. Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra
note 8.
167
See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419,
118 Stat. 2341, 2341 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Skyla
Mitchell, Note, Escape from the Byzantine World of Mechanical Licensing, 24 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1239, 1250 (2007).
168
See Copyright Royalty Board: Governing Laws, http://www.loc.gov/crb/laws (last
visited Aug. 30, 2008).
169
1 PATRY, supra note 24, § 1:110.
170
David Jakhelln & James Menefee, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Intellectual Property Law, 74 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 837, 849 (2006) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(3)).
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distribution of royalties.” 171 The CRB “sits en banc” in a “hearing
process, which includes the potential for discovery, live testimony,
and other trial-like attributes.” 172 After the hearing process, the
three-judge CRB then makes its rate determinations by way of majority vote. 173 Most significantly, however, the Reform Act “removed the Librarian [of Congress] and the Copyright Office from
further involvement in royalty adjustment proceedings.” 174 As a
result, the determinations of the CRB are directly appealable to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 175
II. THE SONG REMAINS THE SAME: A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF
THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD’S MARCH 2007 RATE SETTING
DECISION FOR THE § 114 WEBCASTER’S PERFORMANCE LICENSE
AND THE § 112 EPHEMERAL LICENSE
The first decision of the newly formed CRB was its March
2007 determination of rates and terms for the § 114 webcaster performance license and § 112 ephemeral license for the period from
January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2010. 176 Even with the
elimination of arbitrators and the new CRB system in place, the results of the rate-setting proceedings were “eerily reminiscent” to
those “which occurred in 2002, the last time the royalties were established.” 177 With the recent decision, however, it is not only
small and noncommercial webcasters, “but virtually all of the webcasters involved in the proceeding who believe the royalties have
been set too high, and that many Internet radio stations will be put
out of business if [those royalties] remain in place.” 178

171

H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 20 (2004); see 1 PATRY, supra note 24, § 1:110.
Jakhelln & Menefee, supra note 170, at 849 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 803(a)(2), (b)(6)).
173
Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 803(a)(3) (2006).
174
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,106 (May 1, 2007) (codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 380). “The exception is the limited role of the Register of Copyrights on
questions of law.” Id. at n.72 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(A)(ii), 802(f)(2)(B)(i), and
802(f)(1)(D)).
175
Jakhelln & Menefee, supra note 170, at 850.
176
See Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8; CRB Final Determination, 72
Fed. Reg. at 24,084.
177
Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.
178
Id.
172
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The CRB first issued a notice announcing the commencement
of rate determination proceedings for the § 114 webcaster performance license and the § 112 ephemeral license for the 2006–10
period on February 16, 2005. 179 After the CRB issued its rate determination decision, many parties petitioned the CRB for a rehearing. 180 The CRB subsequently denied the petition. 181 After the
rehearing was denied, many parties appealed the CRB’s rate determination decision to the D.C. Court of Appeals. 182 At its enactment, it was hoped the Reform Act, which eliminated the
CARPs and established the CRB, would make the statutory license
“ratemaking and royalty distribution process less expensive and
more expeditious and efficient.” 183 With over three years past
since the commencement of proceedings, and over a year past
since the initial rate determination of the CRB, still very little, if
anything, has been neatly resolved in the way of statutory license
rates for webcasting. 184 It is hard to see how the ends of the Reform Act have been achieved at all.
Before determining royalty rates, the CRB, in its decision, analyzed the nature and the application of the willing buyer/willing
seller standard. 185 The CRB noted the standard requires a determination of rates and terms “that most clearly represent the rates and
terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace” between a willing buyer and a willing seller. 186 Throughout its decision the CRB relied heavily on the precedent of both the CARP’s
179

Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 70 Fed.
Reg. 7,970 (Feb 15, 2005) (providing a “[n]otice announcing commencement of proceeding with request for Petitions to Participate”).
180
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,085 (May 1, 2007) (codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
181
Id.; In the Matter of Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording and Ephemeral
Recordings, Order Denying Motions for Rehearing (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.
loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2005-1/motion-denial.pdf.
182
See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Briefing Dates Set on Internet Radio Royalty Court Appeal, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internetradio-briefing-dates-set-on-internet-radio-royalty-court-appeal.html (Nov. 20, 2007).
183
H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 21 (2004).
184
Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, A Year After the Webcasting
Royalty
Decision—No
Settlement,
Appeal
Briefs
Filed,
http://www.
broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-a-year-after-the-webcasting-royaltydecision-no-settlement-appeal-briefs-filed.html (Mar. 15, 2007).
185
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,087–88 (May 1, 2007) (codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
186
Id. at 24087 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2006)) (emphasis in original).

VOL19_BOOK1_CAREY

286

12/3/2008 12:42:03 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:257

and the Librarian of Congress’ determinations in Webcaster I. 187
Citing to Webcaster I LoC Determination, the CRB attempted to
clarify the relationship of the statutory factors, which the CRB is to
consider in its webcasting rate determinations, 188 “to the willing
buyer/willing seller standard.” 189 The CRB acknowledged that, in
the case of both the § 114 webcaster performance license and the §
112 ephemeral license, the Copyright Act requires the CRB to:
[T]ake into account evidence presented on such factors as (1) whether the use of the webcasting services may substitute for or promote the sale of
phonorecords and (2) whether the copyright owner
or the service provider make relatively larger contributions to the service ultimately provided to the
consuming public with respect to creativity, technology, capital investment, cost and risk. 190
However, the CRB insisted that these statutory factors do not
themselves define the willing buyer/willing seller standard. 191
Rather, the CRB provided that these “statutory factors are merely
to be considered, along with other relevant factors, to determine
the rates under the willing buyer/willing seller standard.” 192
In considering the nature of the marketplace in which the willing buyer and the willing seller transact, the parties to the proceeding agreed, and the CRB concurred, that the statutory language “reflects Congressional intent for the Judges to attempt to replicate
rates and terms that ‘would have been negotiated’ in a hypothetical
marketplace.” 193 In this hypothetical market, the CRB explained
that it would consider the webcasters as buyers, and the record
companies as sellers. 194 The product changing hands essentially
187

See generally id. at 24,084. To clarify, the CARP’s report in Webcaster I is referred
to herein as “Webcaster I CARP Report,” and the Librarian of Congress’ determination in
Webcaster I is referred to herein as “Webcaster I LoC Determination.” See supra notes
118 & 125 and accompanying text.
188
See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)(i), (ii); id. § 112(e)(4)(A), (B); supra text accompanying note 109.
189
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,087.
190
Id. at 24,088 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 112(e)(4) and 114(f)(2)(B)).
191
See id. at 24,087.
192
Id.
193
Id. (quoting Webcaster I CARP Report, supra note 119, at 21).
194
See id.
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was a blanket license permitting the webcasters to make digital audio transmissions of the “record companies’ complete repertoire of
sound recordings.” 195 Furthermore, the marketplace in which
these parties transact, would be “one in which no statutory license
exists,” 196 seemingly because the CRB believed that it would be
hard to consider “a compulsory license, where the licensor has no
choice but to license,” as truly reflective of “fair market value.” 197
In determining the rates that would be set between a willing
buyer and seller in a hypothetical marketplace, the CRB acknowledged, and both the copyright owners and webcasters agreed that
“the best approach . . . is to look to comparable marketplace
agreements as ‘benchmarks’ indicative of the prices to which willing buyers and willing sellers . . . would agree.” 198 The CRB,
however, strongly rejected proposals by webcasters that would
consider as a benchmark the rates webcasters pay to performing
rights organizations such as ASCAP and BMI for the digital performance of musical compositions underlying sound recordings
(“musical composition benchmark”). 199 Rather, the CRB adopted
a benchmark formulated by one of SoundExchange’s expert witnesses. 200 This benchmark was based on rates found in the market
for interactive webcasting, where users are able to specifically select music that they will receive by way of digital audio transmission (“interactive benchmark”). 201 Interactive services do not
qualify for statutory licensing, and hence such services must negotiate privately with record labels for the right use of sound recordings. 202 The interactive benchmark “was set by taking the rate
paid by certain interactive webcast services . . . and adjusting those
rates to take into account the differences in the statutory services,”
namely “the lesser value to consumers” using statutory services
195

Id. (citing Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,244 (July 8,
2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261)).
196
Id.
197
Id. (quoting Noncommercial Educational Broadcasting Compulsory License (Final
Rule and Order), 63 Fed. Reg. 49,823, 49,834 (Sept. 18, 1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
198
Id. at 24,091.
199
See id. at 24,092, 24,094–95.
200
Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.
201
Id.
202
Id.; supra text accompanying note 99.
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who “do not have the ability to [interactively] select songs” when
receiving webcasts. 203 The CRB accepted this benchmark because
it found the “interactive webcasting market is a benchmark with
characteristics reasonably similar to non-interactive webcasting.” 204 In spite of the many inherent differences between interactive and noninteractive services, 205 the CRB was comfortable using
the interactive benchmark because it found that SoundExchange’s
“expert had applied an appropriate ‘adjustment factor’ to take into
account the differences in value between a consumer-influenced
interactive subscription service . . . [and] service[s] that, by law,
can not be interactive.” 206
While showing much leniency in its willingness to consider the
analogous, but distinctly different interactive webcasting market as
the benchmark for setting rates for noninteractivee webcasting, the
CRB showed no such leeway in its consideration of the webcaster’s proposed musical composition benchmark. 207 In rejecting
the musical composition benchmark in wholesale fashion, the CRB
pointed to the inherent differences between sound recordings and
musical compositions, noting that “substantial empirical evidence
shows that sound recording rights are paid multiple times the
amounts paid for musical works rights” in different markets, such
as those for “digital downloads.” 208 However, in using “digital
downloads” as part of the basis for rejecting the musical composition benchmark by comparison, the CRB shows questionable reasoning. Digital downloads implicate a totally different exclusive
right of the copyright owner than the right at issue in the CRB’s
rate determination proceeding: that being the right of reproduction,
as opposed to the right of performance. 209 To imply that because
203

Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,092.
205
Indeed the differences between interactive and noninteractive services arguably account for much of the turmoil that gave rise to the legislative reform with respect to webcasters in the DMCA. See supra Part I.
206
Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.
207
See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,092, 24,094–95.
208
Id. at 24,094.
209
See
3
PATRY,
supra
note
24,
§
8.23;
SoundExchange,
http://www.soundexchange.com (follow “FAQ” hyperlink under column to the right;
then follow “Does SoundExchange cover downloads?” hyperlink) (last visited Sep. 1,
2008) (“A download is governed by the reproduction right . . . .”); see also United States
v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 443–44
204
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sound recordings are valued more than musical compositions in the
market for reproduction, they will be valued more in the market for
performances as well is to make an unsupported, and unexplained
comparison across markets. To analogize, this very well could be
like saying because people in Alaska pay more for heating their
homes in an average year than they do for air -conditioning, people
in Florida are likely do the same. Admittedly, it may be the case
that the market for performances and reproductions of sound recordings are closer than those for heating and cooling in Alaska
and Florida; nonetheless, without a more nuanced explanation and
understanding of the differences between the markets for the exercise of the exclusive rights of a copyright holder, and the uses of
sound recordings in those markets, it is difficult to understand why
the rate paid for the performance of musical compositions is an inadequate standard from which to base rates paid for the performance of sound recordings.
In a historical context, while “copyright owners of musical
works have enjoyed the performance right since the end of the
nineteenth century,” 210 sound recordings, with respect to the right
of performance, have had literally no valuation until as recently as
1995. 211 If the rates paid for the performance of musical compositions are excluded from consideration by comparison, indeed the
only history then, and perhaps reliable evidence of an approximation of the value of a performance right for sound recordings in the
noninteractive webcasting context are the rates set in Webcaster I.
While the provisions of the SWSA are strict in their provision that
agreements made under the SWSA shall have no precedential
value in future proceedings, 212 no such restriction applies to the determinations of the CARP and Librarian of Congress in Webcaster
I. 213 Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the CRB’s decision liberally re(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Although we acknowledge the term ‘perform’ should be broadly construed . . . the downloading of a music file is more accurately characterized as a method
of reproducing that file.”).
210
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,086 n.3.
211
See supra Part I.
212
See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002,
68 Fed. Reg. 35,008, 35,008 (June 11, 2003); see also text accompanying supra note
140.
213
Indeed, 17 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) provides that the CRB, in its proceedings “shall act in
accordance with regulations issued by the Copyright Royalty Judges and the Librarian of
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lied on the CARP’s and Librarian of Congress’ decisions in Webcaster I as precedent. Curiously, however, the CRB’s report makes
no mention of the actual rate determinations made by the Librarian
of Congress in Webcaster I. Controversial though the Librarian of
Congress’ rate determinations may have been at the time, 214 by
comparison to the CRB’s March, 2007 decision, the Librarian of
Congress’ determination in Webcaster I seems eminently reasonable. At the very least the Librarian of Congress’ rate determinations in Webcaster I were based on a marketplace benchmark that
can actually said to be representative in some part of the marketplace at issue, namely that for digital audio transmissions made by
a noninteractive webcaster. 215 In not acknowledging the Librarian
of Congress’ chosen benchmark and ultimate rate determinations
in Webcaster I, the CRB essentially ignored actual evidence of the
value afforded to the digital performance of sound recordings by a
willing buyer and a willing seller. Effectively then, the CRB
through its use of abstract, hypothetical benchmarks, determined
and applied its own market value for the use of sound recordings
by noninteractive webcasters. This undoubtedly sets a dangerous
precedent for CRB determinations in the future.
Nevertheless, the CRB concluded that the interactive benchmark, by itself “[p]rovides the [b]est [b]enchmark for [s]etting”
rates for commercial webcasters.216 As a result, the CRB abandoned the 0.07¢ per-performance standard that had been in place
for commercial webcasters since Webcaster I, and determined a
new, per-performance rate which steeply escalates in each successive year. 217 Under the CRB’s determination, the new rates for
commercial webcasters per year are as follows: 2006: 0.08¢ perCongress, and on the basis of a written record, prior determinations and interpretations of
the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, Librarian of Congress, the Register of Copyrights, [and]
copyright arbitration royalty panels . . . .”
214
See supra Part I.
215
Recall that in Webcaster I, the Librarian of Congress based his rate determinations
on a willing buyer/willing seller model that largely looked to settlement agreements voluntarily negotiated between RIAA and Yahoo! for the digital performance of sound recordings by Yahoo!’s noninteractive webcasting stations. See Webcaster I LoC Determination, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,245 (July 8, 2002) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261);
Delchin, supra note 2, at 376; text accompanying supra note 128.
216
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,095 (May 1, 2007) (codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
217
See Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.
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performance; 2007: 0.11¢ per-performance; 2008: 0.14¢ perperformance; 2009: 0.18¢ per-performance; and in 2010: 0.19¢
per-performance. 218 These rate increases have proven so dramatic
that even the largest commercial webcasters have expressed an intention to cease webcasting operations if the rates remain in effect. 219 Some webcasters have shut down and others fear they will
soon be forced to follow suit. 220 Indeed Time Warner Inc.’s AOL
has even gone so far as to sell its webcasting business to CBS
Broadcasting Inc., because it felt “[t]here’s no way [it could] build
an Internet radio business . . . with these kinds of royalties.” 221
In its rate determination decision, the CRB acknowledged that
there are two sides of the willing buyer and willing seller equation,
essentially that of the buyer and that of the seller, and that the
CRB’s objective is to create rates representative of a willing
agreement between these two sides. 222 It is hardly apparent, however, to see how a buyer of services would willingly agree to rates
and terms so ruinous that they would make it difficult to “let [their]
business operate at a profit.” 223 Moreover, it is hard to see how
such conditions would even benefit a willing seller: if rates are set
so high so as to eliminate a buyer’s profitable participation in the
marketplace, surely buyers will withdraw, leaving the seller with
its own product in hand, having clearly exceeded an optimal pricing for its product.
Furthermore, the CRB’s decision eliminated the pay as a percentage-of-revenue model that arguably allowed many small webcasters to survive after the Librarian of Congress’ determination in
Webcaster I. 224 Under the SWSA, royalty rates “based on revenues or expenses meant the payments would never exceed the stations’ revenues and put them at risk of going out of business. The
new rate formula the CRB decreed in its March [2007] ruling ef218

See id.
Meg Tirrell, Yahoo, AOL May Abandon Web Radio After Royalties Rise (Update2),
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103
&sid=a0pKOrcpw6yE&refer=us.
220
Bray, supra note 14.
221
Id.
222
See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,091 (May 1, 2007) (codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
223
Bray, supra note 14.
224
See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,088–90; supra Part I.
219
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fectively remove[d] that safe harbor.” 225 Nevertheless the CRB
“specifically rejected a percentage of revenue royalty for reasons
including the difficulty of determining what revenues would be
covered by such a royalty.” 226 The CRB declined to apply a
“revenue-based metric” to both commercial and noncommercial
webcasters alike. 227 The CRB “also imposed a $500 minimum fee
on each station or channel” operated by a webcaster. 228 “These
new rates will also have an immediate administrative impact on
webcasters. Since the rate is calculated on a performance per listener basis, each webcaster will have to track performances for
each individual listener to determine its royalty payments.” 229
Merely as a study in contrast, and not to equate the two different commodities at issue, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York recently convened to determine
Yahoo!, AOL and RealNetwork’s application for a blanket license
from ASCAP. 230 The blanket license was to cover the performance of musical compositions from the ASCAP repertoire on both
interactive and noninteractive music platforms offered by these
services. 231 Although the court was to determine usage rates for
the performance of musical compositions as opposed to sound recordings, the standard for determining this rate was similar to that
used in the CRB’s rate setting procedure for the performance of
sound recordings by noninteractive webcasters. 232 Specifically, in
225

Anthony L. Soudatt & Natalie Sulimani, Net Radio and Royalty Rates, The Sounds,
Perhaps, of Silence, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 2008, § 2, at 1.
226
Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.
227
See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,090 (May 1, 2007) (codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
228
Soudatt & Sulimani, supra note 225, at 4.
229
Id.
230
See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 562 F. Supp.
2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), available at http://www.ascap.com/press/2008/
pdf/ratecourtdecision.pdf; Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Rate Court
Determines ASCAP Fees for Large Webcasters—Some Interesting Contrasts with The
Copyright Royalty Board Decision, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internetradio-rate-court-determines-ascap-fees-for-large-webcasters-some-interesting-contrastswith-the-copyright-royalty-board-decision.html (May 1, 2008).
231
See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Rate Court Determines
ASCAP Fees for Large Webcasters—Some Interesting Contrasts with The Copyright
Royalty Board Decision, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-ratecourt-determines-ascap-fees-for-large-webcasters-some-interesting-contrasts-with-thecopyright-royalty-board-decision.html (May 1, 2008).
232
See id.
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“determining a reasonable fee for [an ASCAP] blanket license” the
court was to make an “appraisal of [its] fair market value—an appraisal based essentially on an estimation of the price a willing
buyer and a willing seller would agree to in an arms-length transaction.” 233
In spite of the nearly identical standards, the rate structure
adopted by the Southern District of New York in the case of the
ASCAP license was drastically different than that created by the
CRB in its rate determinations for noninteractive webcasters.
Whereas the CRB implemented a royalty calculated on a perperformance basis, 234 the Southern District of New York adopted a
royalty based on a percentage of revenue for the performance of
musical compositions. 235 While the CRB bluntly rejected a royalty
based on a percentage of revenue, in the case of the ASCAP blanket license, the court was ample in its praise of the percentage of
revenue approach, in essence observing that:
[1] It was economically efficient, as it did not provide any disincentive to a service not to use music
as might be the case for a royalty that demanded a
per performance fee;
[2] It adapts to changing conditions, as it will collect more when a service makes more revenue and
less when a service has hard economic times, thus
taking into account changing economic and competitive conditions, variations in financial fortunes
and changes in technology and other unforeseen
changes in the circumstances of the services that
may occur over time;
[3] Revenues were simple to verify as information
about total revenues were routinely collected by a
service;
[4] . . . [T]hese royalties provided the kinds of efficiencies expected for a blanket license—easy ad233

Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
234
See supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text.
235
See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
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ministration, that covered all rights to all the music
represented by ASCAP, and gave the service certainty as to its music costs so that it did not need to
take royalties into account in deciding how to introduce any new aspect of its service. 236
Although the ASCAP blanket license covers a different commodity (again musical compositions as opposed to sound recordings), the economic principles behind the licensing aren’t all
that different from those in the § 114 webcaster performance license. Indeed, in the case of the ASCAP license, the court set this
rate structure for not only noninteractive services, but for interactive services as well, 237 which arguably could demand a higher
royalty on account of the end user’s ability to select preferred musical compositions. 238 Even if it’s assumed that the market for the
performance of musical compositions doesn’t provide an
analagous hypothetical marketplace for the performance of sound
recordings, nonetheless, many of the efficiencies of the per percentage of revenue royalty noted by the court in the case of the
blanket license from ASCAP could apply equally well in the case
of the § 114 webcaster performance license, really as they could
for most any business model. Essentially, a royalty structure that
responds to and respectively taxes both increased and decreased
use equally, as the percentage of revenue royalty in the case of the
ASCAP blanket license does, seems far more representative of an
agreement between a willing buyer and a willing seller, than a royalty that has the potential to ultimately exceed revenue, as does that
determined by the CRB in the case of the § 114 webcaster per-

236

Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Rate Court Determines ASCAP
Fees for Large Webcasters—Some Interesting Contrasts with The Copyright Royalty
Board Decision, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-rate-courtdetermines-ascap-fees-for-large-webcasters-some-interesting-contrasts-with-thecopyright-royalty-board-decision.html (May 1, 2008); see Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 480–81.
237
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
238
See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Rate Court Determines
ASCAP Fees for Large Webcasters—Some Interesting Contrasts with The Copyright
Royalty Board Decision, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-ratecourt-determines-ascap-fees-for-large-webcasters-some-interesting-contrasts-with-thecopyright-royalty-board-decision.html (May 1, 2008).

VOL19_BOOK1_CAREY

2008]

12/3/2008 12:42:03 PM

INTERNET RADIO: COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD RATE DECISION

295

formance license and its counterpart, the § 112 ephemeral license. 239
The flaws with respect to the CRB’s rate determinations are
perhaps even more troubling with respect to noncommercial webcasters. In its decision, the CRB created a “two tiered royalty rate”
for noncommercial webcasters. 240 On the first tier of this structure, the $500 per channel fee 241 paid by noncommercial webcasters covers “up to 159,140 Aggregate Tuning Hours . . . of
streaming per month.” 242 If these webcasters stay within this
streaming threshold, they need pay no more in royalties beyond the
$500 cap. 243 However, “[n]oncommercial webcasters who exceed” the 159,140 ATH streaming limit on the first tier, pay the
full “commercial rate for all listening in excess of that limit” on the
second tier. 244 The 159,140 ATH threshold is one that the many
popular noncommercial webcasters are sure to routinely exceed. 245
Thus, while noncommercial webcasters paid a 0.02¢ perperformance rate before the CRB’s March 2007 decision, 246 by
subjecting noncommercial webcasters to full commercial rates,
which themselves have increased substantially based on the CRB’s
use of the interactive benchmark, by 2010, noncommercial webcasters who exceed the minimum threshold, will pay at a rate of
0.19¢ per-performance, a rate more than nine times greater than
239

See Bray, supra note 14; supra text accompanying note 222.
Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.
241
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
242
Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.
243
See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,097, 24,100 (May 1, 2007)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
244
Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8; see CRB Final Determination, 72
Fed. Reg. at 24,100; supra text accompanying note 217.
245
See KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream
Music Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Oct.
21, 2008). An explanation of the 159,140 ATH cap provides as follows:
A station could have 218 streaming listeners per hour for each twenty
four hour day in a month. Since most listeners are not online the
maximum amount per month, the number of average listeners a station can have and remain under the cap is larger than 218.
If a station’s average listener is online four hours a day, it could have
1,300 average listeners per month; if the average listener streamed
music two hours a day, a station could have 2,600 average listeners
per month without exceeding the cap.
Id.
246
See supra Part I.
240
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that previously in place for noncommercial webcasters. 247 In the
words of the CARP in Webcaster I, surely this “affronts common
sense.” 248 Indeed “[i]n the over 25 years that public radio has paid
on-air or online music royalties, this is the first time that a decision
has failed to differentiate public radio from commercial media.” 249
Furthermore, even amongst noncommercial webcasters that
would routinely fall under the cap, “[m]any stations do not have
the data to measure ATH.” 250 Indeed, NPR calculates that almost
80% of its member stations would not be able to calculate listener
volume based on ATH. 251 The reportage requirement alone has
even resigned some stations to stop streaming altogether. 252
In its consideration of noncommercial webcasters, the CRB defined a “segmented” marketplace that ultimately gave rise to the
CRB’s determination of a two-tiered royalty structure. 253 While
the CRB recognized that there are differences between commercial
and noncommercial webcasters, the CRB credited these differences
“only up to a certain point.” 254 That point, essentially, was the
159,140 ATH streaming per month threshold, beyond which the
CRB subjected noncommercial webcasters to full commercial royalty rates. 255 The CRB reasoned that noncommercial webcasters
who operate below this cap represent a distinct, different segment
of the marketplace, than do noncommercial webcasters who operate above it. 256 This is the segmented marketplace the opinion rec247

See Oxenford, Clarifying the Confusion, supra note 8.
Webcaster I CARP Report, supra note 119, at 89.
249
KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream Music Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2008).
250
Id.
251
Press Release, National Public Radio, NPR Files Motion for Rehearing with Copyright Royalty Board (Mar. 19, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/about/press/
2007/031907.copyrightroyalty.html.
252
See Sarah Snyder, KDNE Ends Online Broadcasts, DOANE LINE, Mar. 6, 2008,
http://media.www.doaneline.com/media/storage/paper1214/news/2008/03/06/News/
Kdne-Ends.Online.Broadcasts-3256145-page2.shtml.
253
See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084, 24,097–100 (May 1, 2007)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 380).
254
KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream Music Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2008).
255
See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,100.
256
See id. at 24,098, 24,099–100.
248
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ognized, likening this segmentation to the way residential electricity users occupy a different segment of the market for electricity
than do commercial users, and as such are subject to a different usage rate correspondingly. 257 Likewise, noncommercial webcasters
who stream above the designated 159,140 ATH usage cap, in the
eyes of the CRB, become a different creature altogether. “[A]s a
matter of pure economic rational based on the willing
buyer/willing seller standard,” the CRB seemed to concur with a
SoundExchange expert who suggested that, beyond a designated
cap, noncommercial webcasters enjoying a lower royalty rate may
“cannibalize” the commercial webcasting market. 258 Though it
briefly considered the different factors that distinguish noncommercial webcasting from commercial webcasting, the CRB ultimately concluded that “as webcasting has evolved, some convergence between some noncommercial webcasters can be observed
ultimately resulting in competition for audience.” 259 On the basis
of this purported convergence, the CRB reasoned that noncommercial webcasters who stream in excess of the designated cap ought
to be subject to full commercial rates. 260
In reaching this conclusion, the CRB essentially jettisoned
what it itself had recognized as “a significant history of
[n]oncommercial [w]ebcasters such as NPR and the copyright
owners reaching agreement on rates that were substantially lower
than the applicable commercial rates over the corresponding period.” 261 The CRB recognized the “myriad of characteristics” that
set noncommercial webcasters apart from their commercial counterparts: “[n]oncommercial licensees are non-profit organizations”;
“[t]he noncommercial webcasters’ mission is to provide educational, cultural, religious and social programming not generally
available on commercial venues”; “[n]oncommercial webcasters
have different sources of funding than ad-supported commercial
webcasters—such as listener donations, corporate underwriting or
sponsorships, and university funds.” 262 In considering all these
257
258
259
260
261
262

Id. at 24,097.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 24,098 (emphasis added).
See id. at 24,098, 24,100.
Id. at 24,097.
Id. at 24,098.
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factors, however, the CRB felt that “as webcasting has developed,
some of these traits have become blurred.” 263 However, this argument is unavailing, and to a degree, tautological. By definition a
noncommercial webcaster must maintain these characteristics to
even be considered a noncommercial webcaster at all. 264
The CRB made much of facts that it saw as blending the commercial and noncommercial webcasting market, such as the fact
that “college radio stations use the Live365 service to stream their
simulcasts, making them just another consumer choice available on
Live365 together with numerous commercial stations.” 265 However in the context of traditional broadcast radio, noncommercial
stations, much the same, have always been broadcast on the very
same AM and FM signals as their commercial counterparts, effectively making them “just another consumer choice available” on
the radio dial. 266 Nonetheless, albeit for a different right, noncommercial entities have traditionally enjoyed a different standard
than their commercial counterparts with respect to royalty rates, in
spite of their technological proximity in broadcast radio. 267 Why a
similar proximity should merit a different treatment in the context
of webcasting is not readily apparent.
Furthermore, while the willing buyer/willing seller standard
certainly provides for a less holistic marketplace analysis than the
801(b) standard, 268 surely the unique, non-profit nature of noncommercial webcasters would affect their resources, status, and
purchasing power as a willing buyer in the marketplace. Indeed, it
would even seem to make intuitive sense that as a willing seller,
we might expect a higher compensation from a buyer, such as a
commercial webcaster, whose ultimate use of the product being
263

Id.
See supra note 7 (defining a noncommercial webcaster as one that is “exempt from
taxation under the Internal Revenue Code”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (explaining that “[c]orporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes . . . no part of
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual”
are exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code).
265
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,098.
266
Id.
267
See supra text accompanying note 249; see also 17 U.S.C. § 118 (2006) (providing a
compulsory license for noncommercial broadcasters).
268
See supra text accompanying note 70.
264
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sold was for its own economic gain, as opposed to one with a distinctly non-profit motive, such as a noncommercial webcaster. To
borrow from the CRB’s own example then, it would seem that
treating large noncommercial webcasters as a distinct and separate
segment of the marketplace, when their characteristics remain
largely the same no matter their size, would be like subjecting a
residential electricity user to full commercial electricity usage rates
merely because they had an exceedingly large family.
Even conceding that the willing buyer/willing seller standard
may be as unaccommodating of the unique nature of noncommercial webcasters as the CRB seemed to construe it, perhaps what is
most troubling about the CRB’s opinion is its rejection of prior negotiated agreements between SoundExchange and NPR for the
digital performance of webcasts between 1998 and 2004 as a
benchmark for setting rates under the willing buyer/willing seller
standard. 269 The § 114 webcaster performance license directs the
Copyright Royalty Judges to “establish rates and terms that most
clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing
seller.” 270 It is hard to imagine a clearer representation of the
terms and rates agreed to by a willing buyer and seller, than the
terms actually agreed to by a willing buyer and seller, as were indeed represented in the NPR-SoundExchange agreements. Given
the few prior examples of a comparable valuation for the performance right of sound recordings, the CRB, once again, set a dangerous precedent by ignoring actual evidence of an agreement between a willing buyer and a willing seller for the very right at
issue. Troubling too is the CRB’s rationale for rejecting the NPRSoundExchange agreements as an adequate benchmark: that an
“agreement covering streaming from 1998 to 2004 does not provide clear evidence of a per station rate that could be viewed as a
proxy for one that a willing buyer and a willing seller would negotiate today.” 271 In lopsided fashion, the CRB seemed to make no
provision for an adjustment factor, comparable to the one it liberally used in adapting the interactive webcasting market as a
269
270
271

See CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,098.
17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,098.
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benchmark for setting rates for noninteractive webcasters, 272 for
adjusting a 1998 to 2004 agreement to cover the 2006 to 2010 time
period for rates covering an identical product and usage.
With regard to the § 112 ephemeral license, for both commercial and noncommercial webcasters, the CRB determined “the appropriate § 112 reproduction license rate . . . to be included in the
applicable respective § 114 license rates.” 273 In sum total, by subjecting noncommercial webcasters to full commercial rates, the
CRB has presented noncommercial webcasters with an inherent
conflict of interest. Historically speaking:
[a]n element of public radio’s mission, whether by
broadcast or webcast, is to introduce music and musical performers to the largest possible audience.
Under the CRB decision, however, the more public
radio succeeds in that mission, the larger the fees
become. Practically and financially speaking, the
newly proposed fee structure penalizes public radio
for performing its statutorily-based public service
mission. The CRB decision is directly contrary to
the intentions of the Congress’ public policy objectives in establishing public radio.
The new fee structure imposes a commercial financial and revenue model on the public service, notfor-profit operations of public radio webcasters.
This model is not only inappropriate, but cannot be
sustained by public radio webcasters who operate
for the public good, not their own commercial success. 274
If permitted to stand, the CRB decision will certainly have a
powerful impact on the still nascent webcasting industry. Very little of this impact, it would seem, would stand to benefit Internet
radio, noncommercial or otherwise, and by extension, either a willing buyer or willing seller in the noninteractive webcasting market.
272

See supra text accompanying notes 197–205.
CRB Final Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. at 24,088.
274
KCBX FM—Copyright Royalty Board Decision (CRB) on New Fees to Stream Music Sound Recordings Online, http://kcbx.org/main/Copyright.html (last visited Aug. 16,
2008).
273
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III. TRY A LITTLE TENDERNESS: A CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED
ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESENT WEBCASTING RATE
DETERMINATION PROCEDURE
Although the CRB’s March 2007 rate determination for the §
114 webcaster performance license and § 112 ephemeral license is
presently being appealed before the D.C. Court of Appeals, the
statutory standard for review of a CRB decision is “exceptionally
differential.” 275 Under the CRB, and the CARP process before
that, rate determination proceedings for the digital performance
right have undoubtedly created much conflict between webcasters,
the recording industry and the U.S. Copyright Office alike. In
terms of a resolution for this conflict, while a successful appeal of
the CRB’s rate determination is not impossible, it will certainly be
difficult given the standard of review and the present statutory
standards for setting license rates. 276 Even if the CRB’s determination were to be set aside, however, such a ruling would really
only address the symptom and leave the disease uncured. To a degree, many arguments that are being leveled against the CRB’s decision echo those made in the wake of Webcaster I, where it was
recognized that: “[e]ven if the CARP simply misinterpreted the
[willing buyer/willing seller] standard, Congress should revise the
standard instead of hoping that the Panel gets it right next time.”277
While the SWSA provided relief from many such concerns after
Webcaster I, indeed such relief has proven to be a temporary bandaid on a much more enduring problem. If there was any downfall
to the SWSA, perhaps it was in securing clemency across the webcasting industry in place of resolve to address the statutory standards that gave rise to the need for the SWSA in the first place.
Unfortunately, webcasters now find themselves in a similar imbroglio as a result of a statutory rate proceeding. Although their timing is certainly less than perfect, many parties have now turned to

275

Jakhelln & Menefee, supra note 170, at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
17 U.S.C. § 801(d)(3) (2006) (citing to the standards provided by 5 U.S.C. § 706).
276
Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, What Next for Internet Radio In
Light of the Copyright Royalty Board Decision, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/
archives/internet-radio-what-next-for-internet-radio-in-light-of-the-copyright-royaltyboard-decision.html (Mar. 7, 2007).
277
Recent Legislation, supra note 6, at 1926.
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Congress in hopes of revising the relevant statutory standards. 278
Ultimately such revision may be what is needed to resolve the present tension surrounding webcasting royalty rates.
Perhaps the most fruitful proposal before Congress is one set
forth in the Internet Radio Equality Act (“IREA”). 279 Amongst
other things, the IREA proposes to revise the statutory rate setting
procedure by replacing the willing buyer/willing seller standard
used to determine royalty rates for the § 114 webcaster performance license and the § 112 ephemeral license, with the 801(b)(1)
standard that was originally applied to noninteractive subscription
services and preexisting satellite digital audio radio services under
the DPRA. 280 As opposed to the strict marketplace rationale of the
willing buyer/willing seller standard, the 801(b)(1) standard seeks
to balance “the needs of copyright owners, copyright users, and the
public” in setting statutory rates. 281 The CRB has used the
801(b)(1) standard to set royalty rates for satellite radio for its digital audio transmissions of sound recordings. It is exactly the same
right for which the CRB subjects webcasters to the willing
buyer/willing seller standard. As a consequence of the 801(b)(1)
standard, satellite radio pays a “revenue based royalty” that
amounts to “between six and eight percent of revenues,” a “much
lower rate” than that which the CRB’s recent decision would impose on webcasters. 282
As a matter of basic fairness, “[i]t is hard to reconcile [the] disparate rate structures” that the present statutory scheme has
yielded. 283 “Satellite radio, XM and Sirius, are subscription-based
services that have much deeper pockets than do the majority of
278

See Daniel McSwain, Internet Radio Equality Act Introduced in House, RADIO &
INTERNET NEWSL., Apr. 26, 2007, v.2, http://www.kurthanson.com/archive/news/
042607b/index.shtml; see also Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Senate
Hearing: The Search for Compromise on Music Performance Royalties—Part One: The
Issue of Standards, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-senatehearing-the-search-for-compromise-on-music-performance-royalties-part-one-the-issueof-standards.html (July 30, 2008) (comparing “The Perform Act” with “The Internet Radio Equality Act”).
279
H.R. 2060, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
billtext.xpd?bill=h110-2060.
280
See McSwain, supra note 278, at v.2; supra text accompanying note 70.
281
McSwain, supra note 278, at v.2.
282
Soudatt & Sulimani, supra note 225, at 8.
283
Id. at 8–9.
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Internet webcasters.” 284 Moreover, if we look at the historical rationale for the creation of a digital performance right, the concerns
with webcasting first articulated under the DPRA were specifically
with regard to subscription- and interactive-based services. 285 Indeed, originally:
[T]he distinction between subscription and nonsubscription transmissions was made because it was
felt that the risk of a music service which consumers pay for on a subscription basis poses a moderate
to high risk of replacing the sales of records (either
physical CDs or digital phonorecord deliveries),
while those which are on a nonsubscription basis,
like traditional, advertising supported radio broadcasts, and the like, pose only a low risk of replacing
record sales. 286
Taking this historical rationale for the distinction between subscription and nonsubscription services into consideration, it would
seem to make even less sense to subject nonsubscription based services to the harsher, less encompassing willing buyer/willing seller
standard, while setting rates for subscription-based services, which
are potentially more threatening to the music industry, under the
801(b)(1) standard. 287
The disparity between standards for varying services is even
starker if we look to traditional broadcast radio, where still, in spite
of proposed legislation, 288 no performance right for sound recordings is recognized at all. The idea of affording traditional ra284

Id. at 8.
See supra text accompanying note 61.
286
Kohn, supra note 51, at 12.
287
See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, What a Difference a Standard Makes, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-satellite-radiomusic-royalty-reconsideration-denied-by-copyright-royalty-board-what-a-difference-astandard-makes.html (Jan. 12, 2008).
288
See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, More on the Broadcast Performance Royalty Bills,
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/broadcastperformance-royalty-more-on-the-broadcast-performance-royalty-bills.html (Dec. 19,
2007); Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Senate Hearing:
The Search for Compromise on Music Performance Royalties—Part One: The Issue of
Standards,
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radio-senate-hearingthe-search-for-compromise-on-music-performance-royalties-part-one-the-issue-ofstandards.html (July 30, 2008).
285
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dio broadcasters almost sacrosanct protection against the imposition of a sound recording performance right has traditionally been
justified by the promotional value radio air play has been said to
have on the sale of sound recordings. 289 This justification, however, quickly loses currency if sales of sound recordings start to
decline in any period, as they have done precipitously since the onset of the digital music era. 290 Looking at the broader picture then,
it’s perhaps not all that hard to see below the surface of Congress’
rationale in enacting the DMCA at the insistence of the RIAA, and
subjecting webcasters, and webcasters only, to the willing
buyer/willing seller standard. At a time when the webcasting industry was still very much in development, and paralleled to a degree by the very separate, but nonetheless devastating impact of illegal music downloading, perhaps Congress was rightfully
concerned with the potential effect webcasting would have on the
market for sales of sound recordings. 291 Perhaps, moreover, subjecting webcasters to the willing buyer/willing seller standard was
seen as a way to check a growing industry, a precautionary measure taken to guard against an as of yet unforeseen development.
To the extent this rationale made sense at the time, it may now
be even more appropriate to take measure of the realities of the
webcasting industry, and to adjust the willing buyer/willing seller
standard to the 801(b)(1) standard. Recognizing a sound recording
performance right makes good sense as a means of compensating
the music industry for the use of its copyrighted content, especially
in an era when its traditional streams of revenue have been so ruinously drained. It strains reason, however, to think the ideal solution is to subject a limited segment of the market for the performance of sound recordings to a particularly stringent rate-setting
standard, 292 to leave another segment of that market completely

289

See supra note 36.
See generally Brian Hiatt & Evan Serpick, The Record Industry’s Decline, ROLLING
STONE, June 27, 2007, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/15137581/
the_record_industrys_decline; Ethan Smith, Sales of Music, Long in Decline, Plunge
Sharply, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/
SB117444575607043728-oEugjUqEtTo1hWJawejgR3LjRAw_20080320.html.
291
See Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 2003).
292
Namely this refers to webcasters who are subject to the willing buyer/willing seller
standard.
290
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exempt from paying royalties, 293 and to leave a third market middling somewhere in between. 294 A proposed solution would be to
subject webcasters, radio broadcasters and satellite radio subscription services alike to a unilateral statutory license for the public
performance of sound recordings, digital or otherwise, as determined by a panel of judges seeking to implement the standards
provided for under the 801(b)(1) standard. So doing, it seems,
would inherently allow services on all platforms to operate at a
royalty rate that would allow their continued operation. Under
such a standard, stations would be less likely to sporadically shut
down on the occasion of every CRB rate determination proceeding,
which have been shown to yield unsustainable royalties under their
present administration. In turn, by subjecting all mediums of the
performance of sound recordings to a statutory licensing scheme
under the 801(b)(1) standard, copyright owners would undoubtedly
receive steady revenue from a source that just over thirteen years
ago provided no income at all. Any losses that sound recording
owners feel they would lose by subjecting webcasters to the
801(b)(1) standard instead of the willing buyer/willing seller standard could easily be offset by the expansion of the sound recording
performance right to include transmissions by traditional radio
broadcasters. This is of course presuming that there would be any
losses at all; a sustainable royalty in the first instance may very
well lead to more webcasting stations, and in turn more potential
sources of revenue for a recording industry that should be seeking
to adapt its business model to account for the realities of the market it serves. 295
In conclusion, subjecting webcasters, subscription and satellite
radio services, and traditional radio broadcasters alike to a statutory licensing scheme under a unilateral 801(b)(1) standard, or a
close equivalent, seems to be a strong solution to the current difficulties posed by the institution and administration of a sound recording performance right. With respect particularly to web-

293

Namely this refers to traditional radio broadcasters, who are not subject to any royalty rate for the performance of sound recordings.
294
Namely this refers to satellite radio subscription services, which are subject to the
801(b)(1) standard.
295
Rather than trying to adapt the market to fit an unrealistic business model.
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casters, this proposal is in keeping with the basic purpose of the
Copyright Act. As Justice Stewart described that purpose:
The limited scope of the copyright holders’s statutory monopoly . . . reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to
be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts. 296
The virtues of webcasting have been extolled by its advocates
as providing the public with a far more diverse range of programming than traditional broadcast radio, under its current limitations,
could ever hope to provide. 297 A ruling like that of the Copyright
Royalty Board’s, which runs counter to the ends of promoting a
service such as webcasting, inherently conflicts with the Copyright
Act’s mandate that the copyright laws “ultimately serve the cause
of promoting broad public availability” of the arts. 298 In keeping
with that mandate, Congress should intervene on behalf of webcasters, and by extension the public at large, to institute standards
that will ensure the continued vitality of the burgeoning cultural
outlet of webcasting.
ADDENDUM: THE WEBCASTER SETTLEMENT ACT OF 2008
As this Comment was going to press, Congress passed legislation in the form of the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 which
bears significantly on the issues this Comment raises. 299 The legislation was introduced in light of the CRB’s March 2007 decision
296

MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 374 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 522 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
297
See Delchin, supra note 2, at 360–64; Bray, supra note 14.
298
MERGES ET AL., supra note 19, at 374 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 522 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
299
See Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 114); Press Release, SaveNetRadio Coalition, Senate Approves
Webcaster Settlement Act (Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://www.savenetradio.org/
latest_news/08-10-01.html. The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 was signed into law
by the President of the United States on October 16, 2008. See GovTrack.us, H.R. 7084:
Webcaster Settelement Act of 2008, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h1107084 (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
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in an effort to help support “the survival of webcasting . . . in the
United States” 300 and passed the House of Representatives by
voice vote and the Senate by unanimous consent.301
In rough terms, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 grants
SoundExchange and webcasters until February 15, 2009 to negotiate a settlement agreement to replace the royalty rates set for webcasters by the CRB in its March 2007 decision. 302 Many voices in
Congress seem to represent that the parties affected by the CRB’s
decision are “gradually coming together, and growing closer to
finding common ground.” 303 However because Congress is going
into recess, and “[b]ecause the parties will not be able to finish
their negotiations before Congress recesses . . . and because authority by Congress is required for a settlement to take effect under
the government compulsory license” Congress proposed this legislation. 304 In effect, it gives the parties the necessary authority to
reach a settlement agreement on their own, without Congress’ intervention, in the hopes that “negotiations . . . continue in a positive direction for both sides.” 305 To those ends the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 “grants limited statutory authority to
SoundExchange . . . to enter into and negotiate agreements with
webcasters for the performance of sound recordings over the Internet.” 306
This compromise solution is reminiscent of the results from
Webcaster I, whereby many webcasters would have ceased opera300

154 Cong. Rec. H10278-01, H10279 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep.
Inslee, author of the legislation).
301
Tony Dutra, Legislation/Webcasting: Congress Votes to Allow Webcasters to Negotiate with Sound Exchange, 76 BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 753 (2008). It is
not insignificant to note that the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 was passed while
Congress was in the midst of considering a highly publicized $700 billion government
bailout of the nation’s financial institutions. Posting by Eliot Van Buskirk to Wired Listening Post Blog, Congress Considers Webcaster Bill Too, as Royalty Battle Ensues,
http://blog.wired.com/music/2008/09/congress-to-con.html (Sep. 26, 2008, 04:06:15
PM).
302
See Dutra, supra note 301.
303
154 Cong. Rec. E2148-02, E2148 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2008) (statement of Rep.
Blackburn); see also 154 Cong. Rec. H10278-01, 10278, 10280 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008)
(statements of Rep. Berman and Rep. Inslee respectively).
304
154 Cong. Rec. H10278-01, H10279 (statement of Rep. Berman).
305
Id.
306
Id. (statement of Rep. Smith).
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tions if it weren’t for Congress’ intervention in the form of the
SWSA. 307 In fact, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 essentially revises the Copyright Act by substituting the words “‘Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008’” for the words “‘Small Webcasters
Settlement Act of 2002’” 308 (“SWSA”) and updating the timeline
for agreements from 1998 to 2004 to “‘a period of not more than
11 years beginning on January 1, 2005.’” 309 To encourage settlement discussions among the relevant parties, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 modifies a handful of the conditions of the
SWSA. 310 Namely, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008: makes
the SWSA’s requirement that any agreements between SoundExchange and webcasters include a provision “for payment of royalties on the basis of a percentage of revenue or expenses” permissive instead of mandatory; 311 deletes “[a]ll instances of the word
‘small’ . . . such that all webcasters are now able to make private
deals;” 312 and, in contrast to the SWSA, the Webcaster Settlement
Act of 2008 allows “parties to agree that their alternative rates may
be precedential in future rate-setting proceedings.” 313
The Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 should be regarded with
optimism for the solution it may yield to the complex problem discussed in this Comment. Such optimism, however, should be tempered with a broader perspective. The Webcaster Settlement Act
of 2008 is merely a mechanism to facilitate settlement negotiations. As this Comment was going to press, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 has not yet yielded any rates in settlement; indeed it remains to be seen “if the hard part—actually entering into

307

See Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Webcaster Settlement Act—
What Does it Mean?, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radiowebcaster-settlement-act-what-does-it-mean.html (Oct. 1, 2008); supra Part I.E.
308
Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, sec. 2(4)(A), §
114(f)(5)(D), 122 Stat. 4974, 4974.
309
Id. at sec. 2(1)(B), § 114(f)(5)(A), 122 Stat. 4974, 4974.
310
See generally Dutra, supra note 301.
311
Dutra, supra note 301; Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, sec.
2(1)(D), § 114(f)(5)(A), 122 Stat. 4974, 4974.
312
Dutra, supra note 301; Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, sec.
2 passim, § 114(f)(5) passim, 122 Stat. 4974, 4974.
313
Dutra, supra note 301; Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, sec.
2(3)(C), § 114(f)(5)(C), 122 Stat. 4974, 4974.
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. . . settlements—will occur.” 314 While the Webcaster Settlement
Act of 2008 certainly has the potential to help webcasters survive
the CRB’s March 2007 royalty rate determinations, it should be
recognized as well for what it fails to achieve. Perhaps most importantly, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 does not change
the statutory standard for determining the rates webcasters pay for
the performance of sound recordings. 315 As such, the Webcaster
Settlement Act of 2008 addresses only a fraction of a much larger
problem.
To a degree, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 is consistent with the criticism this Comment levies against CRB rates
yielded by the willing/buyer willing seller standard. It seems to be
a recognition that the rates imposed by the CRB were unsustainable, and perhaps an implicit suggestion that the process that led to
the creation of those rates is flawed. As was observed in commentary in the Senate, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 is, in effect, a “legislative readjustment[].” 316 In other words, it allows the
relevant parties to work around the results of Congress’ own ratesetting procedure, because the results produced by that procedure
proved to be unsustainable. It would seem to this Comment’s author that an ideal solution would address not just the results of that
procedure, as the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 seems to do,
but would remedy the procedure that lead to those results as well.
Indeed, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 still leaves the potential, as anticipated by this Comment, of webcasters having to
shut down operations on the occasion of every CRB rate determination, 317 until and unless Congress is able to intervene with similar “legislative readjustments” 318 in future proceedings. It would
stand to reason that an ideal rate-setting standard would lead directly to the results anticipated by settlement initiatives such as the
314

Posting of David Oxenford to Broadcast Law Blog, Webcaster Settlement Act—
What Does it Mean?, http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/archives/internet-radiowebcaster-settlement-act-what-does-it-mean.html (Oct. 1, 2008).
315
See id.
316
154 Cong. Rec. S10186-02, S10186 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
317
See supra Part III.
318
154 Cong. Rec. S10186-02, S10186 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
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SWSA and the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, rather than hoping that resort to such initiatives will be available in the future.
As such, the thrust of this Comment as outlined in its conclusion remains intact in spite of the Webcaster Settlement Act of
2008. It is this author’s hope that the considerations raised in this
Comment will be addressed by a future Congress which will hopefully undertake to resolve the issues underlying the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 by revising the relevant statutory standards for
setting royalty rates for the performance of sound recordings, not
only for Internet radio, but indeed for broadcast radio and subscription services as well. Congress failed to do so in the wake of the
Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, and after months of turmoil resulting from the CRB’s March 2007 rate determination, it is
hard not to see the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 as a temporary fix rather than a long term solution to an industry-wide disparity.

